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Abstract
Background: Bioethics and law distinguish between the practices of “physician-assisted death” and “allowing the
patient to die.”
Discussion: Advances in biotechnology have allowed medical devices to be used as destination therapy that are
designed for the permanent support of cardiac function and/or respiration after irreversible loss of these
spontaneous vital functions. For permanent support of cardiac function, single ventricle or biventricular mechanical
assist devices and total artificial hearts are implanted in the body. Mechanical ventilators extrinsic to the body are
used for permanent support of respiration. Clinical studies have shown that destination therapy with ventricular
assist devices improves patient survival compared to medical management, but at the cost of a substantial
alteration in end-of-life trajectories. The moral and legal assessment of the appropriateness and permissibility of
complying with a patient’s request to electively discontinue destination therapy in a life-terminating act in non-
futile situations has generated controversy. Some argue that complying with this request is ethically justified
because patients have the right to request withdrawal of unwanted treatment and be allowed to die of preexisting
disease. Other commentators reject the argument that acceding to an elective request for death by discontinuing
destination therapy is ‘allowing a patient to die’ because of serious flaws in interpreting the intention, causation,
and moral responsibility of the ensuing death.
Summary: Destination therapy with cardiac and/or ventilatory medical devices replaces native physiological
functions and successfully treats a preexisting disease. We posit that discontinuing cardiac and/or ventilatory
support at the request of a patient or surrogate can be viewed as allowing the patient to die if–and only if–
concurrent lethal pathophysiological conditions are present that are unrelated to those functions already supported
by medical devices in destination therapy. In all other cases, compliance with a patient’s request constitutes
physician-assisted death because of the pathophysiology induced by the turning off of these medical devices, as
well as the intention, causation, and moral responsibility of the ensuing death. The distinction between allowing
the patient to die and physician-assisted death is pivotal to the moral and legal status of elective requests for
death by discontinuing destination cardiac and/or ventilatory medical devices in patients who are not imminently
dying. This distinction also represents essential information that must be disclosed to patients and surrogates in
advance of consent to this type of therapy.
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Bioethics and law distinguish between the practices of
physician-assisted death and allowing the patient to die,
such as by the withdrawal or withholding of life-support
treatment in an imminently dying patient. Quill [1] used
the term physician-assisted death to describe a spectrum
of life-terminating medical acts intended to accelerate
the dying process and bring about a quick death. Life-
terminating acts include voluntary, involuntary, and
nonvoluntary active euthanasia, and assisted suicide.
Voluntary active euthanasia is the intentional termina-
tion of life at the request of the patient or surrogate.
Involuntary active euthanasia is the intentional termina-
tion of life against the patient’s wish. Nonvoluntary
active euthanasia is intentionally terminating a patient’s
life without a request or consent. Prescribing a lethal
dose of medication that is ingested by a patient is
assisted suicide, whereas giving a lethal dose of a medi-
cation to a competent patient who has voluntarily
requested to end his or her life constitutes voluntary
active euthanasia.
In an acute life-threatening illness or a progressing
incurable disease, lethal pathophysiological conditions
are set in motion that eventually culminate in death (ie,
irreversible cessation of consciousness, respiration, and
circulation). In imminently dying patients, these lethal
pathophysiological conditions will progress to death
despite life-support treatment. Under such circum-
stances, life-support treatment becomes an impediment
to the natural process of dying and physicians withhold
and/or withdraw a harmful, ineffective, or burdensome
treatment. The term life-support treatment is used to
mean support of vital functions of respiration and/or
circulation in contrast to the term life-sustaining-treat-
ment, which includes other treatment avenues such as
artificial hydration, nutrition, and hemodialysis. When
physicians justifiably withdraw or withhold life-support
treatment, they allow patients to die but do not cause,
intend, or bear moral responsibility for the patient’s
death. These medical actions may be perceived as pas-
sive euthanasia, but they are not truly euthanasia
because there is no intent to terminate life.
The literature demonstrates that there is little agree-
ment on the meaning of the term “euthanasia” [2].
Introducing adjectives (ie, active, voluntary, involuntary
or nonvoluntary) to the word euthanasia only adds con-
f u s i o nt ot h ed e b a t eo ne n d - o f - l i f ed e c i s i o n s .W ea g r e e
with the opinion that clearly-defined terms should be
used to describe exactly what actions are taking place
(eg, withdrawal of treatment, continuation of care, relief
of pain, deactivation of medical devices, allowing to die,
assisting to die) so as to improve our understanding of
what really goes on during end-of-life decisions [2]. The
descriptive term of physician-assisted death (dying) is
widely used in the medical literature, replacing other
emotive terms such as physician-assisted suicide and
euthanasia [3-8]. However, the labeling of end-of-life
interventions by physicians as either physician-assisted
death or palliation is not uniform in similar cases [9].
Differences in the labeling of similar acts performed in
end-of-life care can impede societal control even where
physician-assisted death has been legalized. Methodolo-
gical difference in end-of-life interventions such as dis-
continuing a medical device, administering a specific
type or dose of medication, and the time to death may
not be helpful in distinguishing acts of palliation from
physician-assisted death [10].
Advances in biotechnology have expanded the use of
medical devices for permanent mechanical support of
respiration and cardiac function in a process known as
destination therapy when these spontaneous vital func-
tions are irreversibly lost. For example, mechanical ven-
tilators are medical devices used for ventilatory support
(VS) of patients with permanent apnea in destination
therapy; for the latter purpose, such devices often
require a tracheotomy. Single ventricle or biventricular
mechanical assist devices and total artificial hearts are
medical devices implanted for permanent cardiac
s u p p o r t( C S )a sd e s t i n a t i o nt h e r a p yi np a t i e n t sw i t h
end-stage heart failure. We have previously highlighted
several ethical challenges in regard to end-of-life care
and palliation following destination therapy with the left
ventricular assist device (LVAD) [11].
The elective deactivation of mechanical cardiac assist
devices has different legal and ethical consequences in
non-futile situations compared with futile situations
[12]. Physicians often grapple with requests from
patients to turn off their LVADs in non-futile situations
[13]. In this article, we offer a moral and legal assess-
ment of the decision-making process for discontinuing a
constitutive treatment of CS with an LVAD as destina-
tion therapy in non-futile situations. We illustrate the
similarity to discontinuing, at the patient’sr e q u e s t ,a
constitutive (permanent) treatment of VS with a
mechanical ventilator as destination therapy. We argue
that compliance with the patient’s request to terminate
his or her life by discontinuing medical devices for VS
or CS is physician-assisted death except under specific
circumstances. To distinguish physician-assisted death
from allowing a patient to die by deactivation of an
LVAD, we evaluate pathophysiological consequences,
intention, causation, and moral responsibility for the
ensuing death after discontinuation of such a medical
device. Responsibility for death is often considered an
important factor in the moral distinction between termi-
nating life and letting die [14]. This distinction is not
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discontinuing constitutive VS or CS in patients who are
not imminently dying, but it also represents essential
information that must be disclosed to patients and sur-
rogates in advance of consent to destination therapy
with these medical devices. In assessing the moral and
legal status, we differentiate between a constitutive life-
support treatment with a medical device as destination
therapy and temporary life-support treatment in emer-
gency situations for VS or CS for acute life-threatening
illnesses. There is a large body of literature on medical,
ethical and legal issues in regard to forgoing temporary
or emergent life-support treatment in an acute life-
threatening illness. The forgoing of temporary or emer-
gent life-support treatment in an acute life-threatening
illness is accepted as morally appropriate, even obliga-
tory, if predicated on true informed consent [15]. In
contrast, the literature addressing medical, ethical and
legal issues of elective discontinuation of constitutive
life-support treatment in non-futile situations is limited
and remains controversial [12,14,16-18]. In non-futile
situations, the moral significance of acts, omissions and
responsibilities in end-of-life interventions continues to
be debated in the medical literature [19-21].
Discussion
Hypothetical Scenarios
Consider two hypothetical patients: Adam and David.
Adam is a 66-year-old man with traumatic quadriplegia
who has been totally dependent on a mechanical venti-
lator through a tracheotomy because of permanent
apnea for two years. David is a 67-year-old man being
treated for end-stage heart failure with an LVAD
(HeartMate II; Thoratec Corp, Pleasanton, California)
implanted two years earlier. Both men live at home with
their spouses as their primary caregivers. Adam asks his
physician to discontinue VS by turning off the mechani-
cal ventilator and administering medication to ensure a
peaceful death. David asks his physician to discontinue
CS by deactivating the LVAD and administering medi-
cation to induce deep sedation so that he can die a
“swift and dignified death.” We evaluate whether discon-
tinuing constitutive treatment with VS and CS medical
devices, a life-terminating act in these two cases, is
either physician-assisted death or death justified by an
appeal to the rule of allowing the patient to die. In eval-
uating both hypothetical scenarios, we focus on the
decision and action specifically related to turning off the
medical device at the request of the patient. The role of
administering medication and pharmacologically indu-
cing deep sedation that results in the deaths of Adam
and David will not be discussed. We have argued else-
where that it is physician-assisted death to administer
medication for the purpose of inducing continuous deep
sedation to fulfill an elective request for death because
of psychological, social, and existential distress [7].
Types of Treatment With Biotechnological
Medical Devices
A treatment is a therapeutic intervention intended to
restore body functions and health. Treatment can be
temporary (ie, discontinued because of spontaneous
recovery of a pathologically disordered body function),
or it can be permanent if a specific body function is
irreversibly lost. A permanent treatment may be either
regulative or constitutive [22]. A regulative treatment
attempts to regulate body functions, coaxing the body
back toward its own homeostatic equilibrium and base-
line health [22]. A regulative treatment is distinct from
the organism and extrinsic to its function, whether
administered internally or externally to the body. Perito-
neal dialysis and hemodialysis are examples of regulative
treatment because of the permanent loss of intrinsic
kidney function necessary for homeostatic equilibrium
[ 2 2 ] .A ni n t e r r u p t i o no fr e g u l ative treatment results in
metabolic derangement but does not generally cause
abrupt cessation of vital functions (respiration, circula-
tion, and consciousness) or rapid termination of life.
A constitutive treatment takes over a body function
that has been permanently lost and that the body can
no longer provide for itself. Although a constitutive
treatment is distinct from oneself, it replaces or substi-
t u t e sf o ras p e c i f i cb o d yf u n c t i o ne s s e n t i a lt ol i f e .
Mechanical ventilators and cardiac assist devices are
biotechnological medical devices that provide VS and
CS, respectively. The devices that provide these consti-
tutive treatments are used as destination therapy. They
permanently replace vital functions of respiration and
circulation that the body can no longer maintain sponta-
neously. For patients who are totally dependent on a
medical device for VS or CS, rapid cessation of vital
signs and abrupt termination of life will occur if the
operation of the medical device is interrupted. Because
of the moral burden of discontinuing a medical device
that can result in an abrupt termination of life, criteria
have been proposed to differentiate between the two
subtypes of constitutive treatment: replacement and sub-
stitution [22]. Then, it is claimed that it is morally inap-
propriate to discontinue a replacement treatment
because doing so abruptly terminates life and may be
viewed as physician-assisted death. In contrast, it is
believed to be morally appropriate to discontinue a sub-
stitution treatment since such an act is simply a matter
of allowing the patient to proceed to die. The criteria
for categorizing a treatment as a replacement include: 1)
its responsiveness to changes in the organism or its
environment; 2) properties such as growth and self-
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supplies; 4) independence from external control by an
expert; 5) immunologic compatibility; and 6) physical
integration into the patient’s body [22].
The applicability of these criteria in clinical settings
appears limited. First, the moral appropriateness or the
ethical permissibility of discontinuing constitutive treat-
ment on the premise that it replaces or substitutes for a
particular body function is irrelevant regarding end-of-
life decisions. There is no absolute standard for judging
whether a constitutive treatment with a specific medical
device should be considered replacement or substitution
of a body function. To morally justify discontinuing
these medical devices at the request of patients or surro-
gates, some physicians consider implantable electronic
and mechanical cardiac devices (eg, permanent pace-
makers, cardioverter-defibrillators, cardiac resynchroni-
zation therapy devices, and ventricular assist devices) as
substitution treatment [23,24]. Implantable cardiac
devices have also been categorized as life-sustaining
treatment to defend the ethical and legal permissibility
of device deactivation in patients who are making elec-
tive request for death [23]. From a medical perspective,
implantable cardiac devices are different from other
commonly used life-sustaining treatments, because: (1)
these devices can replace native physiological functions
of the heart permanently, (2) they control electric and/
or mechanical functions of the heart continuously, (3)
they are implanted in the body internally, (4) they are
responsive to changing body demands intrinsically, and
(5) they can induce loss of vital signs rapidly upon deac-
tivation. Deactivating a permanent pacemaker in a pace-
maker-dependent patient can induce severe bradycardia
or asystole and a rapid cessation of circulation. In a sur-
vey of 750 health care providers, 11% of respondents
consider that deactivating a permanent pacemaker is
euthanasia [25]. In a survey of 185 physicians at a single
institution, 9% of physicians characterize the deactiva-
tion of a permanent pacemaker in a pacemaker-depen-
dent patient as euthanasia and 19% characterize it as
physician-assisted suicide [26]. Deactivating a ventricular
assist device can induce a rapid failure or complete
arrest of circulation. In a study of end-of-life deactiva-
tion of destination LVAD, all patients became uncon-
scious after turning off the device and death followed in
< 20 minutes in all cases [27]. The lethal pathophysiol-
ogy from device deactivation is determined by the type
of device and the surgical procedure performed to
implant the device in the body and not necessarily by
the original pre-existing heart disease (eg. deactivation
of a HeartMate II induces an acute aortoventricular
regurgitation and deactivating a total artificial heart
induces an immediate circulatory arrest). Permanent
LVAD support can induce new and irreversible
pathological changes in normal heart valves which
become the lethal pathophysiology upon device deacti-
vation [28,29].
A careful assessment of the criteria distinguishing a
replacement from a substitution treatment unravels
inherent clinical inconsistency and confusion about the
classification of implantable mechanical cardiac devices.
In destination therapy, the physically implanted LVAD
becomes an integral part of the body. It is immunologi-
cally compatible with the body and does not require
immunosuppressive medications to prevent its biological
rejection. LVAD settings are responsive to circulatory
demands of the body, but the LVAD lacks the ability to
self-repair and depends on an external energy source.
Thus, an LVAD might be considered replacement rather
than substitution treatment. In contrast, a mechanical
ventilator displays few of the criteria of replacement
treatment; however, in the scenario of a quadriplegic
patient with permanent apnea, many physicians consider
a mechanical ventilator replacement rather than substi-
tution treatment. Additionally, one might argue that a
transplanted heart is not a replacement treatment
because of its immunological incompatibility and the
requirement for immunosuppressive medications to pre-
vent its biological rejection by the body. Close expert
supervision is necessary for monitoring and managing
immunosuppressive medications in a transplant recipi-
ent. If a recipient refuses to continue on immunosup-
pressive medications, death ensues because of rejection
of the transplanted heart. However, it is argued that a
transplanted heart is more likely to be considered repla-
cement rather than substitution of a body function
because it cannot be surgically removed without causing
a patient’s death [22]. The same argument refutes classi-
fying permanent LVAD support as substitution of a
body function [24] because the medical device cannot
be explanted without causing a patient’sd e a t h .T h e
arbitrary classification of a constitutive treatment as
either replacement or substitution of a body function to
ethically permit discontinuation of destination therapy
with a medical device in a life-terminating act cannot be
substantiated factually buti td o e sg i v ef r e er e i nt ot h e
construction of what some commentators have referred
to as a moral fiction [30].
Second, irrespective of classifying a constitutive treat-
ment of VS or CS as either a replacement or substitu-
tion of body function, circumstantial assessment of the
request, causation, intention, and moral responsibility of
life termination seriously restricts the ethical permissi-
bility of discontinuing such a treatment. This will be
illustrated by the discussion of the hypothetical scenar-
ios of Adam and David below.
Finally, it is important to differentiate the discontinua-
tion of a constitutive treatment in the hypothetical
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where either Adam or David would be imminently
dying from a lethal pathophysiological condition inde-
pendent of vital body functions (ie, ventilatory and car-
diac functions) supported by respective medical devices.
Examples of life-ending pathophysiological conditions,
irrespective of continued VS or CS by medical devices
used in destination therapy, may include the irreversible
loss of consciousness from a catastrophic neurological
event, peripheral vascular collapse and shock from an
overwhelming infection, and refractory hypoxia from
worsening lung disease or disseminated malignancy.
Could this difference mark a legally clear and clinically
relevant distinction between physician-assisted death
and allowing patients to die?
Moral Fiction About Discontinuing Constitutive
Medical Devices
Moral fictions are false beliefs upholding entrenched
moral positions in the face of a conduct or practice in
tension with established moral norms [30]. Moral fic-
tions can be culturally entrenched, even when their fal-
sity is exposed. Moral fictions are created from flawed
interpretations of facts or false assumptions about a cer-
tain medical practice. When a specific medical practice,
viewed candidly, appears to conflict with established
moral norms, there is a strong incentive to construe this
practice in a way that seems to remove the moral con-
flict. Moral fictions counteract a cognitive dissonance
originating from an inconsistency between the facts
about that medical practice and the prevailing moral
norms. For critics who recognize the cognitive disso-
nance, moral fictions appear to be patently false [30].
When the discontinuation of destination therapy with a
medical device for VS or CS results in a life-terminating
act, moral fiction is often invoked to avoid construing
such an act as physician-assisted death. Classifying a con-
stitutive treatment as a substitution instead of the replace-
ment of a body function, and then conveniently assigning
an ethical permissibility to discontinuing the former but
not the latter is illustrative of a moral fiction. Moral fic-
tions are intended to convert an ethically challenging life-
terminating act, whether inducing deep coma with medi-
cation and/or discontinuing constitutive VS or CS at the
request of a patient or surrogate, into an act that appears
congruent with the prevailing moral norm; that is physi-
cians must not kill or assist in killing patients.
The pathophysiological conditions leading to death
can distinguish allowing a patient to die from physician-
assisted death. Allowing a patient to die is withholding
and/or withdrawing life-support treatment for a lethal
pathophysiological condition set in motion by a newly
developed acute life-threatening illness or by a chronic
treatment-refractory advanced disease. Physician-assisted
death is creating a new, nontherapeutic, lethal patho-
physiological condition in a human being with the
intention of thereby causing or hastening that person’s
death [22]. Can this pathophysiological differentiation
adequately categorize a physician’s action of discontinu-
ing medical devices for VS or CS?
It is difficult to contend that, in destination therapy, a
medical device for VS or CS that replaces basic vital
body functions is extrinsic to or separate from the
patient’s identity. When a mechanical cardiac assist
device such as an LVAD is successfully implanted, the
recipient perceives this device as part of his or her body
image and sense of self [31]. A patient living with an
LVAD develops an identity that is physically, emotion-
ally, and psychologically dependent on the implanted
device [32-34]. Additionally, a patient with a total artifi-
cial heart has no native cardiac function because the left
and right ventricles are surgically removed to implant
the medical device. A patient’s circulation is then totally
dependent on normal operation of the medical device.
This is not different from a patient’s respiration that is
totally dependent on normal operation of the mechani-
cal ventilator because of permanent apnea. The medical
device becomes a replacement for that body function
which is essential for life and thus is an integral part of
the restored physiology of the patient. The medical
device and its constitutive function are part of the inte-
grated unity of the patient as an intact, living, individual
organism. In destination therapy, medical devices per-
manently replace VS and CS and constitute the vital
signs of respiration and circulation for that patient,
respectively. From a pathophysiological perspective,
turning off a mechanical ventilator or an LVAD creates
a new and nontherapeutic lethal pathophysiological con-
dition by interrupting the patient’s vital signs and result-
ing in death through cessation of circulation,
respiration, and consciousness. To discontinue such
treatment not only discontinues the treatment of preex-
isting disease but also introduces new and nontherapeu-
tic lethal pathophysiological conditions in the patient.
The medical device has successfully treated the underly-
ing preexisting disease (some patients may even mista-
kenly view it as a cure), which is also the original intent
of consent for destination therapy with a medical device.
In the absence of a newly developed acute life-threaten-
ing illness that sets in motion a lethal pathophysiological
condition regardless of VS or CS, turning off a mechani-
cal ventilator or an LVAD would appear to result in a
rapid cessation of vital functions, thus leading to death.
When regulative and constitutive destination medical
devices are discontinued the ensuing lethal pathophysio-
logical conditions can be different. Discontinuing a reg-
ulative treatment (eg, hemodialysis) does not generally
result in an abrupt interruption of vital signs but,
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discontinuing both regulative and constitutive destina-
tion medical devices, new nontherapeutic lethal patho-
physiological conditions are set in motion causing death,
but with different end-of-life trajectories.
The objective assessment of a patient’s request, causa-
tion, intention, and moral responsibility reveal two addi-
tional moral fictions pertaining to the argument that
turning off the medical devices in the hypothetical sce-
nario of Adam and David would not be physician-
assisted death. The first moral fiction concerns 1) the
nature of the patient’s request; 2) the nature of the act
that the physician is asked to perform in either case; 3)
the causal relationship between the act of treatment
withdrawal and the patient’s death; and 4) the intention
of the physician who accedes to such a request. The sec-
ond moral fiction is related to erroneous judgments
about moral responsibility that are based on these mis-
taken factual claims. When shorn of these moral fic-
tions, compliance with the request of either Adam or
David would more appropriately be defined as physi-
cian-assisted death.
Request and Consent for Discontinuing
Constitutive Medical Devices
Respect for autonomy and self-determination entails the
right of a competent patient to accept or refuse a parti-
cular treatment at a specific time. Rescinding a prior
“informed” consent to a constitutive treatment or desti-
nation therapy with a medical device might be consid-
ered to be supported by the patient’sr i g h tt os e l f -
determination. If so, Adam and David would be exercis-
ing their rights of autonomy and self-determination
when they refuse continued constitutive treatment with
a medical device. Bioethicists often argue that withdraw-
ing any life-support treatment is morally and legally
similar to withholding life-support treatment in the con-
text of fatal disease at the end of life. The question then
becomes whether this ethical argument can be applied
to a constitutive treatment with a medical device that is
successfully treating a patient’s fatal disease without the
presence of any new lethal pathophysiological condition.
Can this ethical argument uphold the notion that
Adam’sa n dD a v i d ’sr e q u e s t sa r es i m p l yam a t t e ro f
allowing patients to die rather than a case of physician-
assisted suicide or physician-assisted death?
The term suicide, from the Latin words sui caedere,
means the intentional killing of oneself. Both Adam and
David are making suicidal requests because they believe
that depending on artificial machines for basic vital
functions has made life too burdensome. Although the
concept of rational suicide seems nonsensical to those
who believe that it is always irrational to opt for death,
the definition of suicide in these two hypothetical cases
might also be rejected because neither patient is physi-
cally capable of causing his own death. Both must seek
a physician’s assistance to do so. Both want to die
because they believe that only death will free them from
an increasingly intolerable condition; thus, it is their
requests for assistance in dying that set in motion the
causal chain leading to death if their physicians comply
with those requests. Logically, however, we might infer
that both patients are requesting assisted suicide
because they need the help of someone else to actualize
their wish to die. Regardless of the suicidal nature of
such a request, one could argue that a physician who
accedes to it is not engaging in assisted suicide because
the immediate death-causing act is performed by the
physician rather than the patient. In true assisted sui-
cide, the act causing immediate or imminent death is
performed by the patient. Physically capable patients
can also disconnect themselves from either mechanical
ventilators or LVADs and intentionally cause their own
death. But as mentioned previously, the two ethical
arguments (ie, self-determination and moral equivalency
of withholding or withdrawing treatment) may seem to
support the notion that discontinuing medical devices in
both cases is simply a matter of allowing the patient to
die. However, the assertion that the requests of Adam
and David do not involve suicide is grounded in a moral
fiction. There is no basis for not describing such life-ter-
minating acts as physician-assisted death. Despite the
unequivocal consequence of fulfilling such a request,
some physicians might reject the label of assisted death
when they comply with it because of the moral fictions
regarding causation and intention.
Causation
In these two hypothetical scenarios, both Adam and
David have the potential to live for an unknown time–
even years–supported by their respective medical
devices: a ventilator and an LVAD. What explains
Adam’s death after withdrawal of VS is not the course
of his spinal cord injury but the very act of turning off
the ventilator. David’sd e a t ha f t e rw i t h d r a w a lo fC Si s
not caused by the natural progression of his heart dis-
ease, which is being successfully treated by an LVAD,
but rather by the act of deactivating the LVAD. Turning
off the ventilator or deactivating the LVAD is thus the
proximate and immediate cause of death. This conclu-
sion is supported by the proposed pathophysiological
differentiation between allowing the patient to die and
physician-assisted death. In addition, disconnecting the
ventilator or deactivating the LVAD without the
patient’s consent would constitute an act of nonvolun-
tary active euthanasia.
The withdrawal of a constitutive VS or CS, when fol-
lowed immediately by death, is a life-terminating
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ventilator can sustain life for patients incapable of spon-
taneous breathing implies that stopping mechanical ven-
tilation will end life. Similarly, the very fact that a
mechanical cardiac assist device can sustain life for
patients incapable of spontaneous circulation signifies
that stopping such a device will end life. In other words,
the power to sustain life by technological means goes
hand in hand with the power to end life when those
means are withdrawn.
The discontinuation of the ventilator in Adam’s case
or the deactivation of the LVAD in David’s case is what
results in dying at the time and in the manner each has
chosen for ending his life. They may opt for an elective
request to end life because of the belief that suffering is
pointless, the fear about future suffering or dependency,
tiredness with living, loss of dignity, the wish to die with
dignity, a desire to determine the time of death, a desire
to avoid being an economic burden on others, concern
about family fatigue, or intolerable psychological or
social suffering for themselves or their families. These
reasons are similar to those of patients requesting physi-
cian-assisted death [35]. Hence, we conclude that the
causation argument in describing either Adam’s death
after turning off the ventilator or David’s death after
deactivating the LVAD as merely allowing death rather
than directly causing death can only be made on the
basis of moral fiction.
Intention
Withdrawing a life-support treatment is considered leg-
ally and ethically permissible when it is based on the
valid refusal of treatment by a competent patient or an
authorized surrogate decision-maker because of the
prior preferences of the patient or the sound judgment
of the surrogate about the patient’s best interests [15].
These end-of-life decisions are made everyday for criti-
cally ill patients with acute life-threatening and nonsur-
vivable illnesses who are on life-support treatment in an
intensive care unit. For an imminently dying patient
who is likely to die regardless of life-support treatment,
the intention to discontinue that treatment is to remove
an impediment to a natural death.
Physicians who view the plans of Adam and David as
reasonable given their circumstances, values, and prefer-
ences, and who may be prepared to assist with the
execution of those plans, intend not only to respect the
autonomous choices of the patient but also to cause the
patient’s death. A survey of end-of-life decisions in 6
European countries (Belgium, Denmark, Italy, the Neth-
erlands, Sweden, and Switzerland) demonstrates that
almost half of the physicians reported an explicit inten-
tion to hasten death when they elected to withdraw life-
support treatment [36]. In a survey of intensive care
units in 17 European countries, Sprung et al reported a
similar gray area in end-of-life interventions between
acts to relieve pain and suffering and acts intended to
shorten or hasten the dying process [37]. Neither the
type and dose of medication nor the time to death
could discriminate between acts intended to palliate
symptoms from acts intended to hasten the dying pro-
cess upon withdrawal of life support. Physicians’ true
intentions are private and often undisclosed in end-of-
life care [38]. Intending to hasten death is the same as
intending to cause death because hastening death causes
death to occur earlier than it otherwise would.
Moral Responsibility
Once we uncover the moral fictions concerning the cau-
sation and intention about discontinuing destination
therapy with VS and CS medical devices in the cases of
Adam and David, it becomes clear that denying the
moral responsibility of the physician for his or her role
in their deaths is part of those fictions (Table 1). Specifi-
cally, a physician is morally responsible for causing a
patient’sd e a t he i t h e rb yt u r n i n go f fav e n t i l a t o ro rb y
deactivating an LVAD when this life-terminating act can
be attributed to the physician from a moral perspective.
Is causing death something that the physician did volun-
tarily and knowingly, so that it can be attributed to him?
Physicians are morally responsible for what they intend
to do, as well as for what they do knowingly or
negligently.
The moral responsibility of assisting in a life-terminat-
ing act by discontinuing a destination therapy with a
medical device is not lessened by the consent of a com-
petent patient or a legally authorized surrogate decision-
maker. The moral responsibility for causing death is
shared by the patient or surrogate and the physician.
The primary responsibility rests with the patient or sur-
rogate, but prior authorization for treatment withdrawal
does not negate the physician’s role and moral responsi-
bility for discontinuing a constitutive VS or CS device
and thus for causing the ensuing death (Figure 1).
Moral Assessment of Discontinuing Constitutive
Medical Devices
Finally, we come to the differential moral evaluation of
physician-assisted death versus allowing the patient to
die in response to the patient’s request or the patient’s
refusal of continued treatment by a ventilator or an
LVAD. Per the premise of self-determination, patients
have both a moral and a legal claim-right to stop
unwanted treatment, which physicians and health care
institutions are obligated to respect. The US courts have
ruled that the right to make decisions about medical
treatment is both a common law right based on bodily
integrity and self-determination, as well as a
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commentators interpret the court ruling to uphold the
patient’s right to refuse an ongoing treatment or a suc-
cessful destination therapy with a permanent medical
device implanted in the body [23,24]. On this premise,
deactivation of a permanent medical device in a life-ter-
minating act, upon an elective request for death, is con-
sidered a patient’s right. Compliance with the request,
as a respect for this right, is regarded as allowing the
patient to die and not assisting in death even though
the patient is neither terminally ill nor imminently dying
[23]. The validity of this right is not contingent on the
physician’s endorsement of the patient’sr e a s o n sf o r
treatment refusal. Does the right to refuse a treatment
imply the right to demand a life-terminating act? The
right to refuse a treatment, however, is not the same as
the right to receive any treatment insisted upon by the
patient or a surrogate. Therefore, it can be argued that a
patient’s right to receive or demand a lethal treatment
or intervention (eg, deactivating a medical device) is
open to questioning. Although patients arguably have a
moral liberty-right of noninterference by others when
requesting an abortion or assisted-death, they do not
have a claim-right to receive an abortion or assisted-
death upon demand if the physician is unwilling to
provide such a service. Can a patient’s autonomy legiti-
mize a physician’s role in assisted death? In Vacco v.
Quill,t h eU SS u p r e m eC o u r t“...distinguished between
the refusal of lifesaving treatment and assisted suicide
[assisted death], by noting that the latter involves the
criminal elements of causation and intent. No matter
how noble a physician’s motives may be, he may not
deliberately cause, hasten, or aid a patient’s death [39].”
In Washington v. Glucksberg, “the Court held that the
right to assisted suicide [assisted death] is not a funda-
mental liberty interest protected by Due Process Clause
[of the Fourteenth Amendment of the US Constitution]
since its practice has been, and continues to be, offen-
sive to our national traditions and practices. Moreover,
employing a rationality test, the Court held that...
[state’s] ban was rationally related to the state’sl e g i t i -
mate interest in protecting medical ethics, shielding dis-
abled and terminally ill people from prejudice which
might encourage them to end their lives, and, above all,
the preservation of human life [40].”
Allowing a patient to die by an act of omission (eg,
withholding a treatment) may have different psychologi-
cal effects on healthcare providers than allowing a
patient to die by an act of commission (eg, turning off a
medical device). Furthermore, turning off a VS or CS
Table 1 End-of-Life Discontinuation of Constitutive Medical Devices for Ventilatory and Cardiac Support in Destination
Therapy
Consideration Hypothetical Scenario
Discontinuation of Constitutive Ventilatory Support
With MV (Adam
a)
Discontinuation of Constitutive Cardiac
Support With LVAD
(David
b)
Pathophysiology
Introducing new, nontherapeutic,
lethal conditions
Yes Yes
Request/Consent
Is it suicide? Yes Yes
Is it assisted suicide? Yes Yes
Causation
Is the physician causing death? Yes Yes
Is it an active intervention? Yes Yes
Intention
Is the physician intending death? Sometimes Yes,
sometimes No
Sometimes Yes,
sometimes No
Moral Responsibility
Is the physician morally responsible
for death?
Yes Yes
Is it physician-assisted death? Yes Yes
Abbreviations: LVAD, left ventricular assist device; MV, mechanical ventilator.
aAdam is a quadriplegic patient on permanent ventilatory support with a mechanical ventilator (MV) for two years. Adam asks his physician to administer
medication to induce deep sedation and to turn off the MV so that he can die peacefully.
bDavid is a patient with end-stage heart failure who has had permanent implantation of a HeartMate II (Thoratec Corp, Pleasanton, California) left ventricular
assist device (LVAD) as destination therapy two years earlier. David asks his physician to administer medication to induce deep sedation and to deactivate the
LVAD so that he can die quickly and with dignity.
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ness from which death is imminent may be psychologi-
cally different from a situation lacking such an illness.
For example, if Adam were to develop a life-threatening
kidney infection with septic shock resulting in multiple
organ failure, then continuing VS would be unlikely to
prevent him from dying. In that scenario, turning off
the ventilator is unlikely tob et h ep r o x i m a t ec a u s eo f
Adam’s death. Likewise, if David were to suffer a cata-
strophic, bilateral cerebral hemorrhage resulting in an
irreversible coma, then he would be unlikely to survive
despite continued CS. In such a case, deactivating the
LVAD is unlikely to be the proximate cause of death.
The psychological challenges of complying with such
requests to discontinue the medical device are amplified
because they do not differ in intention, causation, and
moral responsibility from those inherent in physician-
assisted death. Administering lethal doses of medication
(an ordinary tool of medicine) to cause a patient’s death
is active euthanasia. Discontinuing a constitutive VS or
CS (ie, turning off a technology tool of medicine) results
in death. In both situations, there are no real or mean-
ingful differences in the physician’s role. In both cases,
the patients are seeking a swift death with physician
assistance and there is no relevant difference in the cau-
sation and moral responsibility for their deaths.
The Moral Reality of Life-terminating Medical
Decisions
The moral norm in the practice of medicine is that phy-
sicians must not kill patients or intend their deaths.
With few exceptions, such as capital punishment and
just war, US law treats the intentional causing of death
as criminal homicide. In order for the practice of dis-
continuing a constitutive treatment of VS or CS to be
permitted legally and ethically, moral fictions about life-
terminating decisions (in terms of intention, causation,
and responsibility) must be accepted as valid justifica-
tions. One can choose to perceive the discontinuation of
VS or CS as no different from its withdrawal in immi-
nently dying patients, as if it is not suicide or assisted
suicide, as if it is passive euthanasia and merely allowing
death, and as if death is not necessarily intended. Con-
sequently, when discontinuing a constitutive treatment
of VS or CS, physicians would not be considered legally
responsible for causing the death of their patients and
not be guilty of homicide. Perhaps more importantly,
upholding such a perception permits patients and
families who are morally opposed to suicide to accept
the life-terminating decision to discontinue VS or CS
medical devices being used for destination therapy.
Uncovering the plain empirical fact that discontinuing
a destination therapy is, in essence, physician-assisted
death might also have unintended consequences on med-
ical practice. Physicians may become reluctant to engage
patients and family members in conversations about end-
of-life care and the anticipated need for discontinuing
such devices. Physicians may become resistant to
requests from patients or families to discontinue such
medical devices in clinical situations when death is immi-
nent from lethal pathophysiological conditions develop-
ing from new life-threatening illnesses. Moral and public
Figure 1 End-of-Life Discontinuation of Destination Therapy
with Ventilatory and Cardiac Support Medical Devices.
Mechanical ventilators and cardiac assist devices can replace native
vital functions of respiration and circulation in destination therapy,
respectively. Respiration and circulation become totally dependent
on normal operation of these medical devices. Discontinuing
mechanical ventilators and cardiac assist devices used as destination
therapy can create nontherapeutic and lethal pathophysiological
conditions and become the life-terminating events. The absence of
concurrent lethal pathophysiological conditions that are set in
motion by a newly developed acute life-threatening illness and/or a
terminal disease, unrelated to the body function supported by these
medical devices, refutes the notion that discontinuing destination
therapy at the patient’s or surrogate’s elective request for death is
simply allowing the patient to die. Assessment of intent, causation,
and moral responsibility of the ensuing death upon discontinuing
the medical device is consistent with physician-assisted death.
Discontinuing permanent mechanical ventilators and cardiac assist
devices can be viewed as allowing the patient to die if–and only if–
concurrent lethal pathophysiological conditions are present that are
unrelated to vital functions already supported by these medical
devices. Examples of concurrent lethal pathophysiological
conditions from an acute life-threatening illness and/or a chronic
treatment-refractory advanced disease may include: irreversible loss
of consciousness from a catastrophic neurological event, peripheral
vascular collapse and shock from an overwhelming infection,
multiple organ failures, refractory hypoxia from worsening lung
disease or disseminated malignancy.
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therapies might be imperiled. Recognizing the moral pre-
dicament of discontinuing a constitutive treatment might
contribute to unease or reluctance on the part of patients
and families to consent to destination therapy with medi-
cal devices. In addition, the resulting reluctance and
declining use of destination therapy with VS and CS
medical devices could have negative financial conse-
quences on medical device manufacturers and institu-
tions that provide such specialized services.
The inherent growing pressure within the medical com-
munity to expand life-prolonging medical technology
introduces the risk of abandonment of one of the most
important ethical norms in the practice of medicine: phy-
sicians must not harm or kill their patients. Discontinuing
certain types of life-sustaining technology [41,42] and
medical devices [23] (eg, deactivation of antibradycardia
pacing in a pacemaker-dependent patient) in a life-termi-
nating act is prohibited by law in some countries. Some
US states have enacted a Death with Dignity Act to allevi-
ate the tension between traditional norms of medical prac-
tice and the reality of intentional life-terminating acts by
physicians [7]. However, legalizing physician-assisted
death may not be the best resolution of this moral conflict.
Legalization of physician-assisted death in medical practice
can lead to the potential abuse of voluntary active eutha-
nasia because any person can be killed by lethal injection,
whereas withdrawing life-support treatment can kill only
t h o s ew h oa r eo nl i f es u p p o r tand require it to continue
living. Legalization of physician-assisted death might also
expand the withdrawal of life-support treatment with no
consent in incompetent and vulnerable patients. Life-end-
ing interventions without explicit consent are already
being performed on patients whose diseases have unpre-
dictable end-of-life trajectories [8].
It is difficult to continue to pass off a moral fiction as
the truth once the fiction has been exposed. However,
indulging in moral fictions may have worse conse-
quences than facing the moral truth and dealing with
the conflict about certain life-terminating medical prac-
tices. By failing to unravel and abandon moral fictions,
we risk perpetuating an unregulated practice that sends
the medical profession and society down a slippery
slope distant to the fundamental moral values of
humanity. Facing the moral truth is essential to preser-
ving society’s trust in the integrity of the medical profes-
sion and its practice. Confronting the moral truth
should be a powerful motive to explore ways of resol-
ving conflict between certain prevailing practices and
the moral norms of the medical profession.
Summary
Advances in biotechnology medical devices have pro-
duced constitutive (permanent) treatment with
mechanical ventilators and cardiac assist devices for VS
and CS as destination therapy. The moral and legal
assessment of the appropriateness and permissibility of
complying with a patient’s requests to electively discon-
tinue destination therapy in a life-terminating act in
non-futile situations continues to generate controversy.
Some argue that complying with this request would be
ethically justified because patients have the right to
request withdrawal of unwanted treatment and be
allowed to die of preexisting disease. Destination therapy
with VS or CS should be considered a successful treat-
ment of the original preexisting disease. Discontinuing
VS or CS at the request of the patient or surrogate can
be viewed as allowing to die, if–and only if–concurrent
lethal pathophysiological conditions are present that are
unrelated to the functions already supported by the
medical devices in destination therapy. In all other
cases, acceding with a patient’s request constitutes phy-
sician-assisted death because of the pathophysiology
induced by the turning off of these medical devices, as
well as the intention, causation, and moral responsibility
of the ensuing death. The distinction between allowing
the patient to die and physician-assisted death is not
only pivotal to the moral and legal status of elective
requests for death by discontinuing destination cardiac
and/or ventilatory medical devices in patients who are
not imminently dying, but it also represents essential
information that must be disclosed to patients and sur-
rogates in advance of consent to this type of therapy.
Abbreviations
CS: cardiac support; LVAD: left ventricular assist device; VS: ventilatory
support
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